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#### ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

### Congress of the United States

### House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

2125 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC 20515–6115

Majority (202) 225–2927 Minority (202) 225–3641

May 9, 2019

The Honorable Ajit V. Pai Chairman Federal Communications Commission 445 12th Street SW Washington, DC 20554

#### Dear Chairman Pai:

We write to urge the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to examine closely the security of fifth-generation (5G) infrastructure and technology as part of the newly rechartered Communications Security, Reliability and Operability Council (CSRIC), CSRIC VII. The ubiquitous deployment of broadband, including next generation technologies such as 5G, is a priority as we work to ensure every American has access to affordable, reliable, and high-speed internet. As our U.S. network operators, from the largest to the smallest, gear up for significant infrastructure buildout for 5G and other advanced technologies, security should be a critical consideration and associated rules and regulations should be as clear as possible.

We understand the great promise of 5G and its potential to transform both communication networks and the global economy. Security is an important element of a strong network and should be addressed early in its design and deployment. Increasingly, critical equipment in our nation's communications infrastructure is manufactured outside of the United States, by companies controlled by foreign governments. American intelligence and defense agencies have expressed concern that such companies could have an incentive or even obligation to use their network equipment to engage in espionage against U.S. interests and national security.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Fifth-Generation (5G) Telecommunications Technologies: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, R45485 (Jan. 30, 2019); see also Huawei Says It Would Never Hand Data to China's Government. Experts Say It Wouldn't Have a Choice, CNBC (Mar. 4, 2019).

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$  Id.

The Honorable Ajit V. Pai May 9, 2019 Page 2

Policymakers have called for a range of options to address these supply chain risks, including a provision in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act prohibiting Federal agencies from procuring equipment manufactured by named companies or associated with the government of certain countries.<sup>3</sup> We believe that the FCC, too, is well-positioned to make important contributions on these important issues, including securing the supply chain for the equipment and software integral to communications networks.<sup>4</sup> Congress has empowered the FCC to, among other things, ensure that the country's communications networks are being used for the national defense and promotion of safety and property.

Further, the agency has established in CSRIC an advisory body filled with experts from government, industry, and non-governmental organizations for the very purpose of studying the security of our communications systems. Although 5G security is apparently not an explicit focus of CSRIC VII, you have the opportunity to expand to additional issues as you so choose. While we are aware that one working group in CSRIC VI produced recommendations on supply chain risk management in December 2018, this rapidly evolving issue deserves a more explicit focus and attention alongside the many other important issues that body considers.

We believe that policymakers and industry alike would benefit greatly from a thoughtful, careful consideration of these important issues by the FCC and CSRIC. We hope you will consider this as you select members and determine the next steps for CSRIC VII.

Sincerely,

Frank Pallone, J

Chairman

Mike Døyle

Chairman

Subcommittee on Communications and Technology

Greg Walden

Ranking Member

Robert E. Latta

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Communications and Technology

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Pub. L. 115-232 (2018).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> 47 U.S.C. § 151.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See FCC Announces the Rechartering of the Communications Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council for a Seventh Two-Year Term and Solicits Nominations for Membership, Federal Communications Commission, Public Notice, DA 19-292 (Apr. 6, 2019).



May 14, 2019

The Honorable Frank Pallone Chairman Committee on Energy and Commerce U.S. House of Representatives 2125 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515

#### Dear Chairman Pallone:

Thank you for your letter regarding our shared commitment to securing fifth-generation (5G) infrastructure and technology. Threats to the nation's emerging 5G communications infrastructure have been a long-standing concern for U.S. government officials. For example, last year, the Commission proposed to prohibit universal service funding from being used to purchase equipment or services from any company that poses a threat to the national security of our communications networks or the communications supply chain. And last week the Commission denied China Mobile USA's application to provide telecommunications services between the United States and foreign destinations.

The Commission has also taken proactive steps in conjunction with others to protect our 5G networks. Earlier this month, I was honored to be part of the United States delegation to an international conference on 5G network security hosted by the Czech Republic, where there was a broad consensus that the "security of 5G networks is crucial for national security, economic security and other national interests and global stability." At home, the Commission serves as a member of the Department of Homeland Security's Information and Communications Technology Supply Chain Risk Management Task Force. And I am glad to hear you agree with my decision to direct one of the working groups of the newly re-chartered Communications Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council to focus on 5G security.

Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance.

Sincerely,



May 14, 2019

The Honorable Bob Latta
Ranking Member
Committee on Energy and Commerce
Subcommittee on Communications and Technology
U.S. House of Representatives
2322A Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

### Dear Congressman Latta:

Thank you for your letter regarding our shared commitment to securing fifth-generation (5G) infrastructure and technology. Threats to the nation's emerging 5G communications infrastructure have been a long-standing concern for U.S. government officials. For example, last year, the Commission proposed to prohibit universal service funding from being used to purchase equipment or services from any company that poses a threat to the national security of our communications networks or the communications supply chain. And last week the Commission denied China Mobile USA's application to provide telecommunications services between the United States and foreign destinations.

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Sincerely.



May 14, 2019

The Honorable Greg Walden Ranking Member Committee on Energy and Commerce U.S. House of Representatives 2322A Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515

#### Dear Congressman Walden:

Thank you for your letter regarding our shared commitment to securing fifth-generation (5G) infrastructure and technology. Threats to the nation's emerging 5G communications infrastructure have been a long-standing concern for U.S. government officials. For example, last year, the Commission proposed to prohibit universal service funding from being used to purchase equipment or services from any company that poses a threat to the national security of our communications networks or the communications supply chain. And last week the Commission denied China Mobile USA's application to provide telecommunications services between the United States and foreign destinations.

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Sincerely,



May 14, 2019

The Honorable Mike Doyle
Chairman
Committee on Energy and Commerce
Subcommittee on Communications and Technology
U.S. House of Representatives
2125 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

#### Dear Chairman Doyle:

Thank you for your letter regarding our shared commitment to securing fifth-generation (5G) infrastructure and technology. Threats to the nation's emerging 5G communications infrastructure have been a long-standing concern for U.S. government officials. For example, last year, the Commission proposed to prohibit universal service funding from being used to purchase equipment or services from any company that poses a threat to the national security of our communications networks or the communications supply chain. And last week the Commission denied China Mobile USA's application to provide telecommunications services between the United States and foreign destinations.

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